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Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Schon lange stellen die Alpen europa¨ische Transportplaner vor große Herausforderun-
gen. Dieses Nadelo¨hr zu u¨berkommen ist nur u¨ber umsta¨ndliche Alpenpa¨sse mo¨glich,
oder durch Strassen- und Eisenbahntunnels, die teuer zu betreiben und nur anhand sehr
grosser Investitionen zu bauen sind. Von besonderer Relevanz ist hierbei die Sensibilita¨t
des Alpenraums und die damit einhergehenden hohen externen Kosten fu¨r die Alpenla¨nder
und ihre Bewohner. Im Mittelpunkt vieler Diskussionen steht seit geraumer Zeit die
Fo¨rderung des Wechsels des Gu¨tertransitverkehrs von der Strasse auf die Schiene. Eine
politische Maßnahme hierfu¨r ist die Schaffung neuer Transportalternativen im Schienen-
verkehr.
In diesem Papier untersuchen wir die zu erwartenden Auswirkungen des Neubaus eines
transalpinen Eisenbahntunnels zwischen Lyon und Turin auf i) die Marktanteile der
existierenden und der neuen Alpendurchquerungen und ii) die Konsumentenrente, das
heißt die moneta¨re Nutzenvera¨nderung fu¨r Unternehmen, die ihre Gu¨ter u¨ber die Alpen
schicken. Das geplante Infrastrukturprojekt besteht aus einem 53km langen Eisenbahn-
tunnel, der eine neue Transportmo¨glichkeit u¨ber die Alpen ero¨ffnen und dabei die Strasse
entlasten soll. Wir kalibrieren ein partielles Gleichgewichtsmodell, in dem versendende
Unternehmen einen Transportmodus und eine Strecke wa¨hlen, um ihre Gu¨ter von einem
Ausgangs- zu einem Zielpunkt zu transportieren. Spediteure setzen strategisch die Preise
fu¨r ihre jeweiligen differenzierten Transportdienstleistungen. Wir leiten das Marktgle-
ichgewicht her und simulieren anhand dessen den Eintritt eines Produktes von ho¨herer
Qualita¨t und testen seine Wettbewerbsfa¨higkeit. Wir zeigen, dass die zuku¨nftige Strecke
auf regionalen Distanzen (zum Beispiel Lyon - Turin: 315km) wettbewerbsfa¨hig und
wohlfahrtssteigernd ist, auf la¨ngeren Distanzen im Nord-Su¨d-Korridor (zum Beispiel Paris
- Mailand: 850km) seine Wettbewerbsvorteile verliert und im West-Ost-Korridor (zum
Beispiel Madrid - Mailand: 1575km) zum Wechsel von der Strasse auf die Schiene fu¨hrt.
Basierend auf den Ergebnissen dieser Studie ist der Neubau einer qualitativ hochwerti-
gen Transportinfrastruktur nur eine Maßnahme aus vielen mo¨glichen, um einen globalen
Wechsel von der Strasse auf die Schiene zu erreichen. Fu¨r den franzo¨sisch-italienischen
Alpenkorridor ko¨nnten direktere und entschiedenere Maßnahmen – wie zum Beispiel die
Schwerverkehrsabgabe in der Schweiz, die direkt in Investitionen fu¨r Schienenverkehrstra¨ger
fliesst – einen fruchtbareren Weg zur Erreichung des politischen Ziels eines versta¨rkten
Wechsels von der Schiene auf die Strasse darstellen.
Non-technical summary
The Alps have long posed challenges to European transport infrastructure planners. Over-
coming this immense bottleneck is only possible via arduous travels across high-altitude
Alpine passes or through road and rail tunnels that require large efforts to be built and
are expensive to maintain. We analyze the expected effects of building a transalpine rail
tunnel between Lyon and Turin on i) the market shares of the established and the new
suppliers, and ii) consumer surplus. The prospective project consists of a 53km rail tun-
nel providing freight shippers with a new alpine path. We calibrate an equilibrium model
where freight shippers choose a mode and alpine path to ship goods from a given origin to
a given destination. Freight carriers strategically set prices for the differentiated products
they supply. Deriving the market equilibrium, we simulate the entry of a quality-improved
product and test its competitive viability. The prospective alpine path proves both com-
petitive and welfare-enhancing on the regional market, loses its competitive edge on the
wider North-South market, and leads to a modal shift on the West-East market.
We find limited substitutability between freight transport products on a North-South tran-
sit axis. On the Ile-de-France-Lombardia market, the shippers’ decision remains largely
based on the mode choice. The new high-quality rail alternative attracts new demand
but does not succeed in lowering road demand. When we shorten this axis to the regional
market between Lyon and Turin, both a modal shift and an increase in demand for ship-
ping occur, securing exactly the same variations in OG market share and in consumer
surplus. In contrast to the North-South axis, the West-East transit market appears a
better candidate for modal-shift. Between Spain and Lombardia, the new rail link ap-
pears attractive enough for shippers to switch modes. Global traffic does not increase
after the introduction of the new link, suggesting higher volatility of shippers’ preferences
across products on this transit axis. Should European rail integration be fostered, the new
transalpine link between Lyon and Turin could play a complementary part among other
urgent projects. In this respect, it would be of interest to compare the respective impacts
on the West-East transit axis of the Lyon-Turin Transalpine and the Perpignan-Figueras
Transpyrenees between France and Spain.
Based on the analysis, the construction of a new high quality infrastructure may only be
one tool out of a global modal shift-oriented policy toolbox. For the French-Italian Alpine
corridor, more direct and committed intervention based on a variety of policy measures as
observed in Switzerland may open a more fruitful path to the political goal of increasing
modal shift towards rail.
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Abstract
We analyze the expected effects of building a rail tunnel between Lyon
and Turin on i) the market shares of the established and the new sup-
pliers, and ii) consumer surplus. The prospective project consists of
a 53km rail tunnel providing freight shippers with a new alpine path.
We calibrate an equilibrium model where freight shippers choose a
mode and alpine path to ship goods from a given origin to a given
destination. Freight carriers strategically set prices for the differen-
tiated products they supply. Deriving the market equilibrium, we
simulate the entry of a quality-improved product and test its compet-
itive viability. The prospective alpine path proves both competitive
and welfare-enhancing on the regional market, loses its competitive
edge on the wider North-South market, and leads to a modal shift on
the West-East market. We argue that the new infrastructure is only
one tool out of a global modal shift-oriented policy toolbox.
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1 Introduction
The Alps have long posed challenges to European transport infrastructure
planners. Overcoming this immense bottleneck is only possible via arduous
travels across high-altitude Alpine passes or through road and rail tunnels
that require large efforts to be built and are expensive to maintain. A compa-
rable infrastructure project outside of the Alps has been the Channel Tunnel,
for example, connecting France and the United Kingdom via rail. Kay et al.
(1989) predicted the social and private profitability of the Channel Tunnel
project. In this paper, we analyze partial economic returns of public invest-
ment in a specific and much debated trans-Alpine rail infrastructure. To do
so, we adopt a simple equilibrium model approach and compute the changes
in direct infrastructure users’ surplus. This approach can and should ulti-
mately be integrated into a more elaborate cost-benefit analysis.1
More precisely, we analyze the competitiveness of freight transport sup-
ply by rail and road carriers on the Lyon-Turin corridor. We perform an
equilibrium analysis in the context of a discrete choice model (see Anderson
et al. (1992) or McFadden (1981)) which allows to analyze the demand and
competitive supply of differentiated products. We predict the reactions of
all competitors given strategies and consumer behavior when facing a new
product. In our case, the new product is the prospective high speed rail link
between Lyon and Turin, “La Liaison Ferroviaire Lyon-Turin”.2
We simulate the entry of this new transalpine link on three different mar-
kets: regional transport between Lyon and Turin, transit between Spain and
Lombardia, and transit between Ile-de-France-Nord and Lombardia. As an
alternative policy measure we simulate a deliberate change in some alter-
natives’ cost structure, that is the introduction of a higher road tunnel fee
combined with a hypothetical reduction of rail costs.
We find limited substitutability between freight transport products –
hereafter defined as a “mode+alpine path” bundle – on the North-South
transit axis where the shippers’ decision remains largely mode-driven. The
new high-quality rail alternative does attract new demand but does not suc-
ceed in lowering road-demand. On the regional market between Lyon and
Turin, both a modal shift and an increase in demand for shipping occur.
The West-East transit market appears the best candidate for modal-shift as,
between Spain and the region of Lombardia, the new rail link appears attrac-
1De Jong et al. (2005) present a survey on welfare evaluation in the discrete choice
random utility framework.
2The gains in speed for freight trains are mainly driven by highly reduced slopes, namely
down to 12% from currently 30%, in the prospective base tunnel. Detailed information is
available on the web sites http://www.ltf-sas.com and http://www.transalpine.com/
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tive enough for shippers to switch modes. Should European rail integration
be fostered, the new transalpine link between Lyon and Turin could play a
complementary part among other urgent projects.
Moreover, based on our analysis, the construction of a new high quality
infrastructure may only be one tool out of a global modal shift-oriented
policy toolbox. For the French Alpine corridor, more direct and committed
intervention based on a variety of policy measures as observed in Switzerland
may open a more fruitful path to the political goal of increasing modal shift
towards rail.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our demand-
and-supply model. We present our data set in section A and provide our
empirical analysis and simulation results in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Modeling Lyon-Turin Freight Transport
Our goal is to evaluate the prospective changes in social welfare of a rail
infrastructure project. In our setting, based on Ivaldi and Vibes (2008),
consumers, hereafter called shippers,3 choose a transport mode, that is rail
or road, and an alpine path to carry their goods between two specific regions.
Suppliers, hereafter called freight carriers,4 are assumed to compete in prices.
We then derive the market equilibrium and provide results of counterfactual
experiments.
As a first remark, we concentrate on non-combined5 transport modes in
the present analysis. Indeed, we have learned from several phone interviews
with freight logistic firms6 that such a mode is of little importance for most of
their shipping activity. To a large extent, that is a peculiarity to the French
transport sector in which, historically, the road has been the dominant mode
of freight transport. Note also that freight services are not homogenous
goods but consist of a widely diversified set of goods with specific haulage
requirements and logistic needs. This heterogeneity is to some extent ac-
counted for by equilibrium prices set according to commodity characteristics
(such as freshness or hazardousness) which make one choice alternative more
attractive than another. Given that we have information on broad commod-
ity classes and aggregate price data only, we conduct our analysis based on
3“Consumers” can also be seen as logistic intermediaries acting on behalf of goods
producers.
4For example, SNCF and Trenitalia for the Lyon-Turin rail project.
5Combined modes can be both accompanied and unaccompanied transport, where the
former corresponds to piggyback transport and the latter to intermodal container trans-
ports. Piggyback transport is non-existent in our sample.
6GEODIS Calberson GE, GEFCO Network, among others.
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these aggregate data. Our model is, in this respect, stylized and simplified
but would lend to a more detailed analysis if more disaggregate data were
available. However, in practice, transaction price data on transport services
are particularly hard to obtain on a broad basis and we thus believe that
using aggregate data provides valuable insights nonetheless.
Furthermore, as a spatial concern, one needs to distinguish between tran-
sit and regional freight transport. Transit and short-distance freight carriers
exhibit different company characteristics. For example, long-haul transit
freight carriers are rather firms with more than 50 employees, short- and
mid-haul freight carriers are rather smaller firms.7 Accounting for distance-
differentiated markets enables us to better characterize competition between
products. Indeed, it is unclear whether inter-modal competition is fiercer on
long or short distance freight transport markets. Hence, we consider three
types of markets targeted by suppliers that can be subsumed into two broader
market categories, transit and regional transport. “Transit North-South”
(freight traffic between Ile-de-France-Nord8 and Lombardia) and “Transit
East-West” between Spain and Lombardia were chosen based on their im-
portant relative shares of French-Italian transalpine passages. We define as
short-distance transport freight traffic between the area of Lyon and the area
of Turin. Freight traffic on these three markets amounts to 12.6% of total
alpine freight traffic reported during the studied period. While this may ap-
pear a low figure, the traffic scale should not affect competition between the
different alpine products. Rather than traffic volume, geographic coverage
matters in products’ competitiveness. Figure 1 illustrates these three mar-
kets.
2.1 Demand side
Assume a shipper takes a two-step decision:
• first, she decides which mode she wants to carry her commodity with;
• second, she chooses an alpine path.9
This second step is not farfetched. A shipper has an a priori ranking of
paths. This idiosyncratic ranking is first based on the shipped good’s speci-
ficities and, subsequently, on alpine paths’ characteristics. Indeed, different
7London Economics (2003)
8Ile-de-France-Nord defines the metropolitan area of Paris and neighboring regions but
excludes the Benelux countries.
9The available alpine path are: Mont Blanc, Fre´jus, Vintimille, Montgene`vre, or Mont-
Cenis.
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of three considered markets
4
paths exhibit different technical characteristics, as detailed below. An alter-
native is thus a combination of a transport mode and a path to cross the
Alps. Product differentiation is mainly due to geographical and regulatory
aspects.10 We assume that shippers have in mind these qualitative differences
of available products when sending their goods on a given origin-destination
journey (hereafter O–D). In addition to the competing differentiated mode-
path combinations, we assume the existence of an outside good, OG. This OG
accounts for shippers that are interested in transporting their goods across
the Alps by rail or road, yet currently do not. It represents a potential niche
our suppliers can target, thereby inducing further traffic. This is important
to bear in mind, since total consumer welfare would increase with additional
induced traffic.
We classify J alternatives into G groups, where g = 0, 1, 2. Group 0
corresponds to the OG, 1 and 2 correspond to rail and road, respectively.
Shipper i’s utility associated with alternative j is:
Uij = Vj + ij (1)
where:
• Vj is the mean utility level common to all shippers,
• ij corresponds to the departure of shipper i from the common utility
level (also called random part, that is shipper i’s unknown idiosyncratic
taste for product j).
The random component leading to a nested logit demand model can be fur-
ther decomposed as follows:
ij = σ νig + (1− σ) νij (2)
with σ being the degree of correlation between alternatives j belonging to
the same group g. A high σ implies shippers give a higher weight to the
group than to the alternative itself when they pick one. Competition is then
fiercer between modes than between alpine paths. To be consistent with the
random utility maximization concept, the parameter σ must lie between 0
and 1. In the extreme case of symmetric competition where the assumption
of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)11 holds between all alter-
natives, σ equals 0 and the model reduces to the simple logit specification.
In the other extreme of segmentation, where preferences for alternatives are
10Specific haulage requirements, logistic needs, and conveyed goods.
11See McFadden (1981)
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perfectly correlated within nests but independent between nests, σ is equal
to 1.
Random components νig, νij, and consequently ij are standard extreme
value distributed.
We assume the mean utility level to be:
Vj = Ψj − h pj (3)
where:
• Ψj is the aggregate measure of quality of product j
• h represents the sensitivity of utility to price, that is the marginal utility
of cost saving for the shipper.
We then compute the aggregate measure of quality as the weighted sum of
the alternatives’ characteristics:
Ψj = α1 punctualityj + α2 altj + α3 traveltimej + α4maxcapaj (4)
where:
• punctualityj = ratio of highway kilometers over total road kilometers
and actual published punctuality figures12 for road and rail, respec-
tively; expected positive sign for α1.
• altj = altitude, in meters, of path j; expected negative sign for α2.
• traveltimej; expected negative sign for α3.
• maxcapaj = maximum capacity per unit of transportation; expected
positive sign for α4.
We attach specific values to these variables, respective to each product.
Some values deserve further explanation.
Variable traveltimej includes compulsory drivers’ breaks. Every 4 hours and
half, a truck driver has to rest for 45 minutes; after 9 hours of driving, a
truck driver has to stop and rest for 10 hours.
Variable punctualityj codes for the probability for a freight carrier to meet
his travel time target. This is a reliability measure. Even though obviously
correlated, variables punctualityj and traveltimej do not exactly capture the
same path features.
12See SBB Cargo’s Annual Report (2004, page 18) and at SNCF:
http://fret.sncf.com/fr/quisnous/actu/2007/presse/do070618.pdf
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Variable maxcapaj indicates the maximum tonnage one unit load can carry.
This takes into account the fact that there is a more strict heavy goods weight
constraint on using road transport as compared to rail. Finally, variable altj
mainly codes for changing conditions of mountainous weather.
We assume these four speed and reliability measures to be the most rel-
evant for shippers in order to assess quality of available products. Shipper i
chooses the utility-maximizing alternative j, satisfying:
Uij ≥ Uik ∀ k 6= j (5)
Normalizing the mean utility of the outside good to zero, we compute the
probability of choosing alternative j from the probability of choosing group
g and the probability of choosing alternative j conditional on choosing group
g. We apply the methodology proposed by Berry (1994) and widely used
in the estimation of differentiated products demand.13 This methodology
builds upon the assumption that observed aggregate market shares are valid
approximations of choice probabilities. It allows us to derive the mean utility
levels as follows:
ln sj − ln s0 = Ψj − h pj + σ ln sj/g (6)
with sj and sj/g respectively being the total market share and the group
market share of alternative j.
Finally, the own price elasticity of demand of the alternative j is:
µj = h pj
[
sj − 1
1− σ +
σ
1− σ sj/g
]
∀ j ∈ g (7)
2.2 Supply side
We focus on the competitive aspect of cross-alpine freight transport. Com-
peting freight carriers offer shippers a differentiated product combining a
transport mode with a specific alpine tunnel or pass – Mont Blanc, Fre´jus,
Montgene`vre, Vintimille, Mont-Cenis or Gotthard (see figure 2).14
In 2004, the ‘Autoroute Ferroviaire Alpine’, a joint venture between SNCF
and TRENITALIA providing a rail shuttle service for lorries and semi-trailers
through the Fre´jus tunnel, has been experimented and its related traffic re-
ported in our data. However, the generated traffic was so low and the restric-
tions so numerous that we do not consider this alternative relevant for our
13See, for example, Ackerberg et al. (2007) and Ortu´zar (2001).
14We consider the Gotthard passage only on the transit market between Ile-de-France-
Nord and Lombardia.
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Figure 2: Basic discrete choice model
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The shares of the Swiss paths Gotthard-road and Gotthard-rail are high enough (re-
spectively 5.9 % and 2.0 % of their group market) for these two products to be con-
sidered as relevant competitive alternatives on the Transit North-South market.
analysis. It remains to be seen if this mode of transport will prove successful
in the long run.
We assume that each differentiated product is offered by one firm only.
This simplifies reality to a large extent. In particular, the road freight in-
dustry is quite atomistic. In the aggregate, 77.6% of road freight carriers
employed 0 to 5 people and 2.3% of all transport companies had more than
50 employees in France in 2000. In terms of revenue, freight carriers with
less than 50 employees accounted for 59.4% of the industry’s total revenue.15
Given this structure of road supply, competition is likely to be fierce among
road carriers. Therefore, we would intuitively think the latter to be price-
takers rather than makers. Notwithstanding, we argue that demand is rather
captive on each geographical market. This justifies to some extent the strate-
gic role of road carriers as price-makers. In what follows, we assume that
road carriers have some power to set prices above marginal cost.16
In equilibrium, cross-alpine freight carriers set transport prices in order
15EUROSTAF (2003), page 4.
16Ivaldi (2007) maintains this assumption analogously.
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to maximize their profits, knowing their competitors do the same:
Max Πj = (pj − cj) qj −K (8)
with fixed costs K.
The outcome is defined by the set of J necessary first order conditions,
from Ivaldi and Verboven (2005):
pj = cj +
1− σ
h
(
1− σ sj/g − (1− σ) sj
) (9)
The price of a product j is therefore the sum of its marginal cost, cj, and
a mark-up term.
3 Empirical Analysis and Results
Shippers’ and freight carriers’ actions depend on their sensitivities to changes
in the alternatives’ characteristics. We want to measure the impact the
prospective rail link between Lyon and Turin will have on the equilibrium
market shares, prices and consumer surplus. Before rushing into the simula-
tion analysis, we need to derive the equilibrium features of our three markets,
where shippers can choose only from current available alternatives. Our data,
reported in Appendix A, prevents straight statistical estimation of the model.
Therefore, we need to calibrate the model, that is to find the equilibrium val-
ues of the demand parameters, h and σ, as well as the quality parameters in
Equation 4. We can then define the equilibrium outcome and simulate likely
changes following the new link’s introduction. All numerical computations
were done using Matlab.
3.1 Model Calibration
Following the procedure by Ivaldi and Vibes (2008), we first derive the de-
mand parameters h and σ. To do so, we linearize Equation 7 defining price
elasticities. We do not have data on elasticities but we do have data on
market shares, prices, and, contrary to Ivaldi and Vibes (2008), marginal
costs. We repeatedly draw 1000 vectors of elasticities, based on the normal
distribution function, with a standard deviation of 4. We set the mean of
this distribution to be equal to the commodity-specific values presented in
Oum et al. (1990), weighted by the commodity shares transported on each
link. We then obtain values of h and σ to each draw of 1000 elasticity vectors
using ordinary least squares estimation. These values allow us to derive a
9
Table 1: Equilibrium outcomes
Short-distance Transit North-South Transit East-West
Share of outside alternative in % 15 30 45 15 30 45 15 30 45
Road Market Shares
Mont-Blanc 7.0 5.8 4.5 34.5 28.5 22.4 - - -
Fre´jus 57.4 47.2 37.2 34.6 28.5 22.4 0.8 0.6 0.5
in % Montgene`vre 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.04 0.03 0.02
Vintimille 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.5 83.76 68.97 54.18
Gotthard - - - 5.0 4.1 3.2 - - -
Rail Market Shares
Mont-Cenis 18.8 15.5 12.2 8.0 6.6 5.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
in %
Vintimille - - - - - - 0.2 0.2 0.2
Gotthard - - - 1.7 1.4 1.1 - - -
Marginal utility of cost saving
0.006 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
(Parameter h)
Degree of within-group correlation
0.40 0.44 0.52 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.56 0.56 0.62
(Parameter σ)
Own-Price Elasticities
Mont-Blanc -4.27 -4.11 -4.19 -1.81 -1.85 -1.89 - - -
Fre´jus -1.48 -1.63 -1.73 -1.87 -1.92 -1.96 -6.93 -6.93 -6.78
(Road) Montgene`vre -3.70 -3.54 -3.61 -3.25 -3.21 -3.2 -6.93 -6.93 -6.78
Vintimille -5.86 -5.60 -5.71 -4.34 -4.28 -4.22 -0.53 -0.98 -1.20
Gotthard - - - -2.99 -2.96 -2.93 - - -
Own-Price Elasticities
Mont-Cenis -1.63 -1.53 -1.38 -1.23 -1.22 -1.21 -3.57 -3.58 -3.36
(Rail)
Vintimille - - - - - - -3.47 -3.48 -3.25
Gotthard - - - -2.37 -2.34 -2.31 - - -
Consumer Surplus 296 160 43.8 1556 780 190 1092 528 150
marginal cost vector from Equation 9 for each of these draws. We finally
keep the h and σ values, as well as the associated vector of elasticities µj,
which correspond to the closest match of predicted marginal costs with our
vector of observed marginal costs. We use these results to solve the sys-
tem of equations defining first the quality parameters Ψj, second the quality
components described in Section 2.1 and Appendix A.1, and third their co-
efficients in Equation 4. We thus solve a system of five linear equations and
four unkowns, and derive consumers’ valuations of each quality variable. We
present the results on elasticity and parameter values in Table 1. Note that
the elasticity values are calibrated to our very specific markets and thus can-
not be easily interpreted outside of these markets nor be directly compared to
estimates in the literature that stem from different markets or are aggregate
averages.
Small values of h underline the intuitive fact that individuals have a larger
marginal utility of income than a firm’s marginal utility of saving costs. On
both transit markets, h is even lower. Indeed, as pointed out in section 2,
long-distance freight shippers are rather large companies while short- and
medium-distance freight shippers tend to be relatively small companies. In-
tuitively, it makes sense that the latter care more about cost savings.
The high value of σ shows low substitutability between the nests of differ-
entiated products in the alpine freight transport market. The mode choice
remains the main component of the shippers’ decision.
In terms of market shares, only the transit market between Spain and
Lombardia exhibits a true dominant alternative: Vintimille (road). This
10
remains true whatever the OG market share. This demand rigidity is also
reflected in the price-elasticities ranking on this specific market since the
lowest price-elasticity is associated with the Vintimille (road) alternative.
More generally, the model endogenously implies that small market shares
go along with high absolute values of elasticities. Therefore market shares’
rankings on our three markets directly translate into elasticities’ rankings, in
absolute values. We present values of the quality indices and the weights of
the quality indices’ components in Table 2. All coefficients have the expected
signs.
As we do not know the exact market configuration, we allow the OG share
to vary between 15 and 45% of the total freight transport market. Alpine
traffic forecasts could help to determine the situation we are in. However,
these forecasts differ across scenarios and do not appear reliable. Indeed,
most of them are suspected to largely overestimate freight alpine traffic by
the years 2020 and 2030.17 In what follows we focus on the “OG = 15%”
case for our equilibrium and simulation analysis. Qualitatively, the results
carry over to the two scenarios with larger OG market shares.
17ECMT Report (2001)
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3.2 Simulations and Results
We can now simulate the entry of the new rail link using its quality charac-
teristics and the demand parameters from the calibrated model. Appendix
D elaborates this procedure in more detail.
3.2.1 Results in the short-distance market between Lyon and Turin
Table 12 (see Appendix B) shows the results, for different initial market
shares of the outside alternative, in point-to-point transport between Lyon
and Turin.18
A global overview of our first simulation result underlines three impor-
tant effects of the new link provision in the regional market. First, the two
rail alternatives manage to capture more than 37% of the total inter-regional
traffic, the new transalpine link taking most of it (27%). Second, the two in-
cumbent Fre´jus products (road and rail) lose the most after the introduction
of the new link. Third, consumer surplus increases by almost 6%.
The rail mode plays a very important part and appears fairly competitive
on the inter-regional market between Lyon and Turin. Facing the biggest
loss in terms of market shares, the representative supplier of the Fre´jus road
product nevertheless increases its prices by 13.5%. Its historical competitors
tend to align their prices around an average of 365 euros.
Going into detail, we see that prices do not vary homogenously. The
two main road alternatives, Fre´jus and Mont-Blanc, increase their prices
by similar amounts: 13.5% and 12.6% respectively. By contrast, the two
“outsider” road products, Montgene`vre and Vintimille, cut their prices by
quite large amounts: 37.6% and 33.6% respectively.
The rather captive Fre´jus demand19 and its high quality index relative to
the other alternatives explain most of the price reaction to the new rail prod-
uct. Indeed, these two features allow the Fre´jus road supplier to compensate
its loss in market share - mostly to the benefit of the new rail alternative -
by a price increase. The less competitive Montgene`vre road and Vintimille
road providers benefit from the weaker market position of the Fre´jus road
alternative. They even compete more fiercely20 to gain market shares at the
expense of the Fre´jus road supplier. Therefore, road carriers’ reactions to
18The new alternative is assumed to have the same marginal cost as the historical Mont-
Cenis alternative served by SNCF since we do not have expected cost data for the new
alternative. In principle, implementing a variation in cost would be straightforward.
19See the own price elasticity µFrejus = −1.48.
20There are no tunnel fees for these passages. Hence, substantially lower marginal costs
allow significant price drops.
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the entry of the new “Liaison Ferroviaire Lyon-Turin” depend on their rela-
tive historic market power. Historic dominant providers are very sensitive to
the induced inter-modal competition and consecutively alter their pricing be-
havior to compensate their loss in market shares. Historic “outsiders” take
advantage of their competitors’ weaker posture and toughen their pricing
strategies in order to get “a bigger piece of the bigger cake”.
The substantial increase in the rail market share is partly due to the
increase of global market size.21 However, most of it results from a modal
shift in favor of the new rail alternative. Undoubtedly, the strong market
position of the new link comes at the expense of the historical rail alterna-
tive Mont-Cenis. The latter, however, manages to keep a reasonable share
of total regional traffic, thanks to its price competitiveness relative to the
two main road products. As for the new link, its high quality index as well
as its competitive price make it a viable competitor of the two main road
alternatives on the regional market. Note, however, that we are looking at a
very specific short-distance market. We thus have to be cautious when com-
paring the change in market shares to ones in more geographically aggregate
settings.
As a concluding remark, the introduction of a high quality alternative and
the decrease in the OG’s market share induce an improvement of consumer
surplus. However, this consumer gain remains of rather low magnitude.
3.2.2 Results in the transit market between Ile-de-France and
Lombardia
Table 13 (see Appendix B) shows the results for freight journeys between the
Ile-de-France and Lombardia regions.
Three salient facts summarize behaviors on this North-South freight tran-
sit market. First, intra-modal competition within both nests is fierce. Sec-
ond, the new rail alternative captures 11.2% of the total market, quasi as
much as the Gotthard (11.4%) which ranks third among road products.
Third, consumer surplus increases by 6%.
As in the regional market, the entry of a higher quality rail product
induces “predatory” behavior among outsiders, namely Montgene`vre, Vin-
timille and Gotthard road path providers, within the road nest. The latter
engage in large price-cuts – -37%, -43.5%, -30.5% respectively – in order to
increase their market share – by 200%, 450% and 128% respectively – and
take the best out of weakened dominant Fre´jus and Mont-Blanc road sup-
pliers. However, contrast with the regional market, the new alternative does
21See the OG share decrease of 8%.
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not trigger noticeable modal shift. It succeeds in attracting new shippers in
the market – 8% decrease in the OG share – but globally fails in captur-
ing demand from road alternatives. Its higher quality makes it the best rail
alternative despite a price even higher - 1231 euros against 1121 and 1097
euros - than the ones of its two major road competitors, Mont-Blanc and
Fre´jus. Nevertheless, the new link does not appear to be competitive relative
to road supply. In this respect the “Liaison Ferroviaire Lyon-Turin” alone
cannot be the relevant modal shift device its proponents claim it to be. At
least not on the North-South transit freight market. Therefore, only a more
global transport policy scheme taking into account the strategic behavior in
both supply and demand may achieve a substantial shift in transport modes.
Albeit of absolute importance, induced variations in prices and market
shares do not alter the historic relative ranking of the different alpine prod-
ucts.
3.2.3 Results in the transit market between Spain and Lombardia
In the transit market between Spain and Italy shippers use the rail path
in Vintimille. In Table 14 (see Appendix B) we see that the new rail link
does not significantly impact global demand for shipping between Spain and
Lombardia. Indeed, the decrease in the OG market share only amounts to
0.5% and consumer surplus does not change at all. Therefore, we conjecture
that the new alternative’s 7% market share corresponds to a genuine modal
shift on this transit market. Indeed, the new link erodes road alternatives’
market edge of 6,5%. Add to this the 0.5% decrease in the outside good
share, it almost amounts to the total rail alternatives’ share.
Far more striking, however, is the gain of the Fre´jus road alternative
which succeeds in elevating its market share by 12.8 percentage points due
to strong price competition. In this market, the latter alternative takes the
outsider role benefitting most from competitive price-setting on the dominant
Vintimille alternative given its extremely captive demand.
3.2.4 Results from a change in the cost structure in the transit
market between Ile-de-France and Lombardia
Table 15 (see Appendix B) shows results of a change in the cost structure
in freight journeys between the Ile-de-France region and Lombardia. We
simulate a twofold increase of tunnel fees at the Mont-Blanc and Fre´jus road
tunnels and a simultaneous reduction of marginal costs of rail transport by
one half. We interpret this as a political measure of cross-subsidizing from
road to rail transport. The change in the cost structure can achieve a modal
15
shift comparable to that induced by the introduction of an entirely new
infrastructure.
Comparing Tables 13 and 15 reveals a comparable reduction of the main
french passages’ market shares by raising their tunnel fees. An important
part of this reduction is absorbed by the Gotthard road alternative tripling
its market share due to its cost advantage. Modal shift from road to rail is not
as strong - 11.1% rail share as opposed to 15.0% when introducing the new
alternative - and only present towards the Gotthard rail passage. While the
introduction of a new rail alternative induces new traffic, the fact of higher
road costs and lower rail costs increases the share of the outside good. Given
the absence of a new high-quality alternative, this political measure therefore
reduces total traffic as well as consumer surplus. The relevant question is
then whether the difference in consumer gains/losses over-compensates the
costs of building a new infrastructure. At the very least, this simulation
exercise illustrates that creating new infrastructure may not be an exclusive
solution but that there exist various alternative policy measures leading to a
comparable end.
4 Conclusion
The model used in this paper allows to derive demand and supply equilibrium
behavior in a market with product differentiation. We apply this model to
the alpine freight transport market with differentiated “mode & alpine path”
products in order to test the competitive viability of the prospective “Liaison
Ferroviaire Lyon-Turin” project.
As a first structural result we find limited substitutability between freight
transport products on a North-South transit axis, despite their heterogeneity
beyond the mere modal split. Indeed, on our Ile-de-France-Lombardia mar-
ket, the shippers’ decision remains largely based on the mode choice. The
new high-quality rail alternative attracts new demand but does not succeed
in lowering road demand. When we shorten this axis to the regional mar-
ket between Lyon and Turin, both a modal shift and an increase in demand
for shipping occur, securing exactly the same variations in OG market share
and in consumer surplus. Therefore, the global impact of the new link on
the North-South transit market seems merely local. The demand rigidity for
road raises a methodological problem: mean utility specification demands
a profound knowledge of shippers’ choice criteria.22 Micro-level data – col-
lected during face-to-face interviews for instance – would be of great help in
22Time and monetary costs certainly remain the most important.
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this respect. Precise criteria relevant for modal shift could be revealed this
way and appropriate policy measures undertaken.
In contrast with the North-South analysis, the West-East transit market
appears a better candidate for modal-shift. Between Spain and Lombardia
indeed, the new rail link appears attractive enough for shippers to switch
modes. Note that global traffic does not increase after the introduction of
the new link, suggesting higher volatility of shippers’ preferences on this tran-
sit axis. Should European rail integration be fostered, the new transalpine
link between Lyon and Turin could play a complementary part among other
urgent projects. In this respect, it would be of interest to compare respective
impacts on the West-East transit axis of the Lyon-Turin Transalpine and the
Perpignan-Figueras Transpyrenees.23
From a modeling viewpoint, improving the approximation of product
flexibility – so far captured by variable “Punctuality” in our mean utility
specification – should receive particular attention in future studies on the
subject. As a matter of fact we believe the most obvious drawback of rail
freight transport is its exclusivity : choosing rail in Lyon excludes changing
modes until Turin. A delay forecast after the train departure cannot yet find
remedy in a switch to a more flexible transport mode. In this respect inter-
modality seems to be the key component of a competitive rail product. So
far, however, inter-modal freight transport has not had the success needed
for a significant modal shift. In the French Alps, the “Rolling Highway” has
been inexistent until 2005 when it accounted for 0.7% of total French Alpine
freight tonnage. The corresponding value for Switzerland in 2005 was 5.2%.
While on the rise in Switzerland, unaccompanied combined freight tonnage
has been falling in the French Alps from 8.6% in 2000 to 5.9% in 2005, and
this even while observing a decrease in total freight tonnage.24
Based on our analysis, the construction of a new high quality infras-
tructure may only be one tool out of a global modal shift-oriented policy
toolbox. For the French Alpine corridor, more direct and committed inter-
vention based on a variety of policy measures as observed in Switzerland
may open a more fruitful path to the political goal of increasing modal shift
towards rail.
23http://www.nouvelletraverseedespyrenees.com/historique.html
24Bundesamt fu¨r Verkehr (2006)
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A Data
A.1 Supply side
In order to characterize the alternatives and accurately assess freight carriers’
costs and posted prices, we conducted several phone interviews and gathered
all available (to us) information.
However, we cannot directly observe marginal costs. We collected data
on costs and prices of infrastructure use, and on fuel consumption to approx-
imate them. These components are short-run cost variables. That is why we
deliberately leave aside personnel costs which correspond to long-run costs.
This choice of components seems all the more reasonable that our cost values
are very close to the ones computed and published by the Comite´ National
Routier, on an annual basis.25 We explain our approximations and compu-
tations in Appendix C. In what follows we detail posted prices and born
marginal costs on each market.
A.1.1 Prices, costs, and characteristics for the short-distance mar-
ket
Table 3 shows collected prices and computed marginal costs for each passage
and mode. Table 4 presents the above-described quality components of the
5 existing alternatives as well as the new transalpine link. Travel times in
hours are calculated based on speed, distance and stopping periods.
Table 3: Prices and Marginal Costs for passages from Lyon to Turin per 24t
load (in euro)
MC Price
Road Mont-Blanc 365 475
Road Fre´jus 331 489
Road Montgene`vre 126 383
Road Vintimille 290 600
Rail Mont-Cenis 216 343
Rail New transalpine link 216 reported after simulation
25http://www.cnr.fr/grilles couts/e-docs/00/00/00/26/document grille cout.phtml
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Table 4: Characteristics of the different alternatives for freight transport
between Lyon and Turin
Altitude Punctuality Travel Time Capacity
Road Mont-Blanc 1328 0.87 6 24
Road Fre´jus 1158 0.89 4 24
Road Montgene`vre 1860 0.52 6 24
Road Vintimille 9 0.97 21 24
Rail Mont-Cenis 1158 0.77 11.60 60
Rail New transalpine link 478 0.80 7.60 60
A.1.2 Prices, costs, and characteristics for the transit market be-
tween Ile-de-France-Nord and Lombardia
Table 5 shows prices and marginal costs for each product on the Ile-de-
France-Nord-Lombardia transit market. Given their relatively high market
shares, we include on this North-South freight market two “Swiss products”:
Gotthard-rail and Gotthard-road.
Table 5: Prices and Marginal Costs for passages from Ile-de-France-Nord to
Lombardia per 24t load (in euro)
MC Price
Road Gotthard 348 1085
Road Mont-Blanc 553.5 1056
Road Fre´jus 564.5 1093
Road Montgene`vre 357 1114
Road Vintimille 479 1493
Rail Mont-Cenis 518 920
Rail Gotthard 515 913
Rail New transalpine link 518 reported after simulation
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Table 6: Characteristics of the different alternatives for freight transport
between Ile-de-France-Nord and Lombardia
Altitude Punctuality Travel Time Capacity
Road Gotthard 1150 0.98 23 24
Road Mont-Blanc 1328 0.94 23 24
Road Fre´jus 1158 0.96 23 24
Road Montgene`vre 1860 0.83 25 24
Road Vintimille 9 0.98 28 24
Rail Mont-Cenis 1158 0.77 28 60
Rail Gotthard 1150 0.79 28 60
Rail New transalpine link 478 0.80 24 60
A.1.3 Prices, costs, and characteristics for the transit market be-
tween Spain and Lombardia
For values on the transit market we consider what we call “geographic av-
erages”, i.e. we simply use price and cost values for the O-D relationship
Madrid - Lombardia (North of Italy). This is admittedly quite a simplifica-
tion but should nevertheless produce representative results. A much more
complex analysis would be needed if all details of intra-European transit were
to be fully taken into account. Table 7 shows prices and marginal costs for
each passage and mode in Spain-Italy transit.
Table 7: Prices and Marginal Costs for passages from Spain to Lombardia
per 24t load (in euro)
MC Price
Road Fre´jus 832 1926
Road Montgen6`12 586 1910
Road Vintimille 606 1891
Rail Mont-Cenis 913 1351
Rail Vintimille 897 1351
Rail New transalpine link 913 reported after simulation
Table 8 presents the quality components of the 6 existing alternatives as
well as the new transalpine link.
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Table 8: Characteristics of the different alternatives for freight transport
between Spain and Lombardia
Altitude Punctuality Travel Time Capacity
Road Mont-Blanc 1328 0.97 44 24
Road Fre´jus 1158 0.97 43 24
Road Montgene`vre 1860 0.91 43 24
Road Vintimille 9 0.99 42.5 24
Rail Mont-Cenis 1158 0.77 49 60
Rail Vintimille 9 0.77 48 60
Rail New transalpine link 478 0.80 45 60
A.2 Demand side
Within our random utility framework and to best assess the benefits from
the planned Lyon-Turin new link, individual level data would be needed.
This kind of micro-level data can be produced through expensive and time-
consuming surveys that are not feasible in the scope of this paper. We
therefore choose to use the inversion method proposed by Berry (1994). This
methodology requires aggregated data, such as market shares and informa-
tion on prices, along with some quality variables within the discrete choice
framework. Applying this method on the O-D pair Lyon-Turin we follow
Ivaldi and Vibes (2008) and look for market shares of passages on this par-
ticular link.
For all three markets, we obtain market shares based on tons transported
on each alpine passage from the CAFT26 2004 database. This database
gathers information on freight transport with respect to origin, destination,
alpine passage, transport mode, weight, etc. Table 9 illustrates these shares
for the inter-regional traffic between Lyon and Turin which accounts for 4.6%
of total freight traffic crossing the French-Italian Alpine corridor in 2004.
Table 10 illustrates these shares for the freight transit traffic between
regions Ile-de-France-Nord and Lombardia. This traffic amounts to 1.6% of
total freight traffic crossing the Western alpine corridor in 2004.
Table 11 presents the passages’ shares for transit traffic between Spain and
Lombardia. This market accounts for 6.4% of all traffic crossing the French-
Italian Alpine corridor in 2004. On this O-D relation, the Vintimille-road
26“Cross-Alpine Freight Transport”, Collected every 5 years over the entire alpine arch
by Austrian, French and Swiss authorities.
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Table 9: Short-distance current freight traffic shares of French-Italian pas-
sages between Lyon and Turin, 2004
Passage Market Share
Road Mont-Blanc 8.2 %
Road Fre´jus 67,5 %
Road Montgene`vre 1.6 %
Road Vintimille 0.5 %
Rail Mont-Cenis 22.2 %
Table 10: Current transit freight traffic shares of French-Italian passages
between Ile-de-France-Nord and Lombardia, 2004
Passage Market Share
Road Gotthard 5.9%
Road Mont-Blanc 40.7%
Road Fre´jus 40.8%
Road Montgene`vre 0.4%
Road Vintimille 0.9%
Rail Mont-Cenis 9.3%
Rail Gotthard 2.0%
product clearly dominates the market. Strikingly enough are the comparable
shares of both rail products: Mont-Cenis-rail captures a market share almost
as large as the one of its Vintimille-rail group-competing product. Therefore,
a new and better performing rail link close to the geographical location of
the Mont-Cenis tunnel may be able to capture some market share.
Chosen markets only cover 12.6% of total freight traffic reported in the
CAFT 2004 database. One may therefore be tempted to question the rel-
evance of these markets or their ability to capture representative behaviors
of consumers. As pointed out before, geographic features of one “product”
are crucial to its competitiveness. The new rail link explicitly targets North-
South freight traffic and aims at diverting it from other Alpine paths. The
ex ante traffic size, on this peculiar market, is not relevant for the new rail
to prove attractive or not. Moreover, we do account for market size, and its
likely extension, via the outside option.
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Table 11: Transit freight traffic shares of French-Italian passages between
Spain and Lombardia, 2004
Passage Market Share
Road Fre´jus 0.90 %
Road Montgene`vre 0.04 %
Road Vintimille 98.56 %
Rail Mont-Cenis 0.24 %
Rail Vintimille 0.26 %
B Simulation results
Table 12: Equilibrium outcomes after introduction of the new transalpine
rail link
Short-distance (Lyon-Turin)
Initial share of outside alternative in % 15 30 45
Values (in euro) and Change in % Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆
Road prices
Mont-Blanc 481 +12.6% 486 +2.3% 483 +1.7%
Fre´jus 555 +13.5% 561 +14.7% 556 +13.7%
Montgene`vre 239 -37.6% 243 -36.5% 241 -37.1%
Vintimille 398 -33.6% 403 -33.0% 401 -33.2%
Rail prices
Mont-Cenis 343 0.0% 344 +0.3% 339 -1.2%
New Transalpine Link 434 - 460 - 462 -
Road market shares in %
Mont-Blanc 7.1 -4.0% 5.8 0.0% 4.8 +6.6%
Fre´jus 32.0 -44.6% 26.8 -43.2% 22.4 -40.0%
Montgene`vre 5.8 +346.0% 4.5 +310.0% 3.8 +322.0%
Vintimille 3.5 +600.0% 2.7 +575.0% 2.3 +666.0%
Rail market shares in %
Mont-Cenis 10.2 -45.7% 7.5 -51.6% 5.1 -58.2%
New Transalpine Link 27.6 - 25.1 - 19.6 -
Market share of outside alternative in % 13.8 - 8.0% 27.7 -7.6% 42.1 -6.4%
Consumer surplus 313 + 6.0% 181 +13.0% 69.6 +60.0%
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Table 13: Equilibrium outcomes after introduction of the new transalpine
rail link
Transit North-South (Ile-de-France-Lombardia)
Initial share of outside alternative in % 15 30 45
Values (in euro) and Change in % Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆
Road prices
Mont-Blanc 1097 +4.0% 1101 +4.2% 1095 +3.7%
Fre´jus 1121 +2.5% 1125 +3.0% 1118 +2.3%
Montgene`vre 704 -37.0% 709 -36.3% 713 -36.0%
Vintimille 843 -43.5% 847 -43.3% 849 -43.1%
Gotthard 754 -30.5% 757 -30.2% 757 -30.2%
Rail prices
Mont-Cenis 916 -0.4% 916 -0.4% 917 -0.3%
Gotthard 868 -5.0% 872 -5.5% 876 -4.0%
New Transalpine Link 1231 - 1269 - 1294 -
Road market shares in %
Mont-Blanc 26.6 -23.0% 22.2 -22.1% 17.9 -20.1%
Fre´jus 27.7 -20.0% 23.1 -19.0% 18.6 -17.0%
Montgene`vre 1.2 +200.0% 1.0 +233.0% 0.7 +133.0%
Vintimille 4.4 +450.0% 3.6 +500.0% 2.7 +440.0%
Gotthard 11.4 +128.0% 9.4 +129.0% 7.3 +128.0%
Rail market shares in %
Mont-Cenis 3.1 -61.2% 2.4 -63.6% 1.8 -65.4%
Gotthard 0.7 -59.0% 0.6 -57.1% 0.4 -63.6%
New Transalpine Link 11.2 - 9.9 - 8.2 -
Market share of outside alternative in % 13.7 -8.0% 27.9 -7.0% 42.3 -6.0%
Consumer surplus 1649 +6.0% 876 +12.3% 295 +55.3%
Table 14: Equilibrium outcomes after introduction of the new transalpine
rail link
Transit East-West (Spain-Lombardia)
Initial share of outside alternative in % 15 30 45
Values (in euro) and Change in % Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆
Road prices
Fre´jus 1165 -39.5% 1159 -40.0% 1158 -40.0%
Montgene`vre 893 -53.2% 893 -53.2% 898 -53.0%
Vintimille 1995 +5.5% 1962 +3.7% 1941 +2.6%
Rail prices
Mont-Cenis 1189 -12.0% 1189 -12.0% 1195 -12.7%
Vintimille 1173 -13.2% 1173 -13.2% 1179 -12.7%
New Transalpine Link 1601 - 1598 - 1691 -
Road market shares in %
Fre´jus 13.6 +1600.0% 10.4 +1633.0% 7.6 +1420.0%
Montgene`vre 1.6 +3900.0% 1.2 +3900.0% 0.85 +4150.0%
Vintimille 62.88 -25.0% 53.2 -22.8% 44.65 -17.6%
Rail market shares in %
Mont-Cenis 0.01 -95.0% 0.007 -96.5% 0.005 -95.0%
Vintimille 0.01 -95.0% 0.008 -96.0% 0.005 -97.5%
New Transalpine Link 7.0 - 6.4 - 3.02 -
Market share of outside alternative in % 14.92 -0.5% 28.785 -0.4% 43.87 -2.5%
Consumer surplus 1092 0.0% 565 +7.0% 184 +22.6%
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Table 15: Equilibrium outcomes after an increase in road tunnel fees and a
reduction of rail marginal costs
Transit North-South (Ile-de-France-Lombardia)
Initial share of outside alternative in % 15 30 45
Values (in euro) and Change in % Value ∆ Value ∆ Value ∆
Road prices
Mont-Blanc 1275 +20.7% 1278 +21.1% 1272 +20.5%
Fre´jus 1297 +18.7% 1300 +19.0% 1294 +18.4%
Montgene`vre 707 -36.6% 711 -36.2% 715 -35.8%
Vintimille 853 -42.9% 857 -42.6% 858 -42.5%
Gotthard 783 -27.8% 785 -27.6% 782 -27.9%
Rail prices
Mont-Cenis 916 -0.4% 925 +0.6% 931 +1.2%
Gotthard 682 -25.3% 688 -24.7% 693 -24.1%
Road market shares in %
Mont-Blanc 23.9 -31.1% 19.5 -31.6% 15.3 -31.5%
Fre´jus 24.9 -28.1% 20.4 -28.6% 16.0 -28.4%
Montgene`vre 1.8 +331.8% 1.4 +317.1% 1.0 +296.2%
Vintimille 6.4 +753.6% 5.1 +719.3% 3.8 +676.7%
Gotthard 15.7 217.1% 12.6 +209.5% 9.7 +201.3%
Rail market shares in %
Mont-Cenis 7.9 -1.0% 6.3 -3.3% 4.9 -5.5%
Gotthard 3.2 +92.6% 2.6 +88.2% 2.0 +82.8%
Market share of outside alternative in % 16.2 +8.0% 32.1 +7.0% 47.3 +5.1%
Consumer surplus 1471 -5.5% 690 -11.5% 103 -45.8%
C Costs and price approximations
C.1 Marginal costs - Road
For trucks, marginal costs include costs of infrastructure use, such as road
and tunnel fees, and fuel costs. The former are available from infrastructure
operators, that is highway and tunnel operators. We take fuel consumption
values given by an online route planner.27 Using the per liter price for truck
diesel in June 2004 of 0.87 cents, we compute fuel costs on each passage.
C.2 Prices - Road
Pricing in truck freight is mainly done according to the type of carried goods,
weight and distance. These components obviously leave room for price dis-
crimination that we cannot take into account in this study. We use prices
generated by a pricing tool used by a typical road freight carrier and obtained
via telephone interviews with road freight companies. For more precise re-
sults, a more sophisticated - but less tractable - price behavior, for example
non-linear pricing, should be adopted.
27http://www.autoroutes.fr
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C.3 Marginal Costs - Rail
In rail transport, marginal costs are also given by the costs of infrastructure
use and fuel consumption. Data on infrastructure charges can be found
either at RFF that manages and operates the French rail network, or, at the
European level, at the EICIS Portal.28 Energy consumption of a standard
locomotive pulling a standard train of 800 tons29 is considered here. We also
account for the higher energy consumption on tracks that exhibit steeper
slopes. As we were not able to extract values on operational costs of freight
trains from several interviews with large rail freight companies, we have to
use rather hypothetical values here. Again, knowing exact marginal cost
values could enhance the quality of our results. Furthermore, there obviously
exists a remarkable degree of heterogeneity in train technologies, train sizes
and weights that we leave aside in this study for the sake of simplicity and
tractability.
C.4 Prices - Rail
For rail prices, we take tariffs for a 24t shipment on a standard 4-axle train
wagon with a capacity of 60t on the distance of the existing rail link from
SNCF’s freight tariff scheme.30 From an interview with a representative of a
large European freight carrier we know, however, that actual prices usually lie
about 15% below these tariffs, due to the possibility of negotiation, quantity
discounts and else.
D Simulation of the entry of a new transport
link
Once the model is calibrated we can proceed to the simulation of the entry
of a new alternative. Since we know the new alternative’s quality character-
istics and have previously derived the coefficients of quality components in
the quality index we obtain the quality index for the new alternatives and
therefore Vj. Next, we need to recover freight carriers’ pricing behavior when
a new competitor arrives. We do this using the pricing Equation 9 and the
28http:// www.eicis.com
29Christen et al. (2004)
30http://fret.sncf.com/fr/espclnt/ncc/index.asp
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following expressions for the alternatives’ market shares that incorporate the
quality index in the nested logit setting (see Clerides (2008) or Trajtenberg
(1989)):
First, define:
Dg =
∑
j∈Jg
e
Vj
1−σ (10)
Then, we obtain:
Intra-group market share:
sj/g =
e
Vj
1−σ
Dg
(11)
Group market share:
sg =
D
(1−σ)
g∑
gD
(1−σ)
g
(12)
Total market share:
sj = sj/g sg =
e
Vj
1−σ
Dσg
[∑
gD
(1−σ)
g
] (13)
Share of the Outside good:
s0 =
1∑
gD
(1−σ)
g
(14)
We solve Equation 9 for the new price vector p and obtain the new market
shares using the above expressions, which is straight forward. Disposing of
prices and mean utility values after the introduction of new alternatives we
can furthermore compare the net consumer surplus the decision maker faces
before and after the introduction of a new alternative. We take the expression
in Ivaldi and Verboven (2001):
CS =
1
α
ln
(
G∑
g=1
D(1−σ)g
)
(15)
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